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How to Save Immortality of Human Individuals:
A Lesson from Schopenhauer as Contemporary Philosopher
The basic claims of my article are as follows:
1. In Schopenhauer's metaphysics »personal immortality« is possible.
2. Thus, in a sense, Schopenhauer is still living; he is our contemporary. This means we can still learn from him, he is not an outdated philosopher. He is worth thinking and interpreting.
3. If we pursue the first thesis further, it might be claimed that Schopenhauer's metaphysics could acquire a new meaning; an unexpected salvation may emerge in his system: by treating human individuals as works of art, through this aesthetic experience, we may become aware of a surprising possibility to free us from the brute force of the will as well as from the constraints of the phenomenal world.
I
What Death Can Teach
Death can teach us in philosophy. In fact, death has been the teacher of not a few philosophers. As Schopenhauer - one of death's leading students - emphasizes, the knowledge of death can guide us toward a metaphysical view which can console us when facing an impending death.1 Moreover he affirms, as does Socrates,2 that philosophy is a preparation for death. Death is an »inspiring genius, a muse of philosophy«, without which it is hardly possible to philosophize. In this sense, death becomes the >impulse< to philosophizing. This is not the only >function< of death in philosophy. In addition to this auxiliary role usually based on principal presuppositions of the metaphysical system, death could also hold a primary place by constituting the most important node in the systems conceptual web. However, to my knowledge, there is unfortunately no such system as yet. I would hope, proceeding from certain conceptions of death, some proposals will be developed in the future regarding the problems of logic, epistemology, ontology, aesthetics, and, of course, ethics. This is an issue requiring comprehensive treatment at a later date; for this paper it is sufficient to say that Schopenhauer starts with the wonder of death, develops his system, and returns to his starting point. Much of what Schopenhauer says on death, together with his conception of >Idea< results in some very interesting leads, and if followed through, we are rewarded with the discovery of hitherto unnoticed aspects of his metaphysics.
II
How Immortality is Generally Attained
The will does not come into being and does not perish [471]. It is in nunc stans, is permanent, endless, now. So the will does not die.3 Everything in the phenomenal world is mortal, because of its temporality. Phenomena which are manifestations of the one, indivisible will, show themselves as individuals. Individuals die, not the will. In this sense, our essence, our innermost nature, the thing-in-itself cannot die, but our physical appearances decay, perish, die. If you consider human beings as members of the world as representation, then; they are mortal. On the other hand, if you view them as manifestations of the one and all-imperishable will in essence, they are immortal. We are immortal at the cost of losing our individuality. The price to be paid for immortality is very high indeed!
Fortunately, we also have imperishable objects: (Platonic) Ideas.4 Ideas are immediate objectivity of the will.5 They are permanent, unchangeable forms, independent of the temporal existence of individual beings.6 The Idea exhibits itself to perception as an object. Ideas are different gradations of the objectification of the will.7 They are objects among the objects in the phenomenal world. They can be grasped only through perception and are objects for subjects [175]. Yet the Idea is eternal. Its empirical correlation is the species, which is of endless duration. Once again, we encounter the possibility of immortality only by losing our individuality. For Nature doesn't care about individuals, only species.8 So far as species (Idea, Eidos) are known, they are no longer individuals.9
In sum, at death we depart from the phenomenal world.10 Our consciousness extinguishes, we lose our intellect which manifests itself as the brain;11 therefore our individuality perishes. The world of hic et nunc in which the will en expresses itself is the world of plurality; in it, individual beings are condemned to death! The root of immortality lies in our innermost nature: in the will.12 The will is one and all, plurality and individuality are mere illusion. The Veil of Maya, the world of appearance, the principium individuationis conceal this. This is the usual view of most of Schopenhauer's interpreters.
III
The Way to Immortality of Human Individuals
To show the possibility of immortality for at least some persons, we can follow two paths. The first passes through the realm of ethics. The other path belongs to the domain of aesthetics. It should be very interesting to see that the intersection of these two ways opens a largely untrodden road to immortality. Let us start with ethics.
Motives of our actions are causes seen from within. Causes are the production of the original natural force, e.g., the will; when they pass through the medium of cognition, they are called motives.13 I ndividually constituted will manifests itself in human beings as character. Thus, every individual reacts differently to the same motives. This character is not known a priori, but through experience; in this sense, it is empirical. Though empirical character is different for everyone, basic characteristics of the human species are repeated in every human individual. Despite its universality, in human beings, the will expresses itself in the particular. This may imply that there is such a thing as quanta of the will. Yet, bearing the character's empirical quality, it comes into being and passes away. No enduring characteristics at all can be claimed. But it remains the same throughout the whole life because it is inborn, not the product of accidental conditions, but rather the work of nature itself. Since what happens in the phenomenal world happens necessarily, quid quid fit, necessario fit, our empirical characters have already been predetermined. The will, here, does not work arbitrarily, it bears an unalterable nucleus within itself, and allows itself to be known by means of consciousness. Then consider the principle operari sequitur esse: what you do follows what you are, everyone acts according to her or his own nature. And you are strictly dependent upon your empirical character. Freedom lies in the esse, in the will, not in its appearance.
Ironically, knowledge of this necessity can only tell us: Tat tvam asi: This thou art.
So far, so good. I have claimed nothing against the established view. But the crucial points are as follows. In addition to the empirical character of human beings, we have intelligible characters of species [156]. In fact, every species is a phenomenon, the manifestation of an intelligible character which is an indivisible act of the will that is outside time. Now following the second path, through the aesthetic realm, we may infer that some people, especially genii can be representative of the human species; their empirical characters may be so typical that they may be exemplary of intelligible characters. In art one single case stands for myriad others.14The individual can exhibit the Idea to which s/he belongs. For example, a picture may lead us away from the individual and toward form. Yet form is nothing but Idea [422]. For the nature of is to guide us from the individual which exists once and never again, to that which exists perpetually, i.e., to the Idea. So we witness an important but much overlooked aspect of Schopenhauer's metaphysics: A human individual can be an Idea. In fact, the character of an individual man, in so far as it is thoroughly individual and not entirely included in that of the species, can be regarded as a special Idea (besondere Idee), corresponding to a particular act of objectification of the will. This act itself would then be his intelligible character, and his empirical character would be its phenomenon.15
If a human being can be considered as special Idea, since the Ideas are atemporal beings, then human beings can be immortal. Yes, one's body perishes in space and time, but one's Idea will remain forever.
IV
The Possibility of Individual Immortality Opens New Vistas
We have now come to the point from which we can proceed to a somewhat novel understanding of Schopenhauer's metaphysics. Before we begin our journey of interpretation, let us reconsider the foregoing argument on immortality.
1. Each individual human being has an unalterable empirical character in the phenomenal world.
2. This unalterable empirical character is the manifestation of an Idea. An Idea is a grade of objectification of the will. So the will »appears in a definite individual in a definite degree«.16
3. Individuals, due to their differentia, may possess the so-called special Idea [158]. In fact, an individual keeps the >universal< in herself/himself. S/he serves to reveal the Idea of her/his own being.
4. Therefore, since the Ideas never die, special Ideas, too, will remain as they are forever, though their manifestations no longer exist.
5. Thus far it has been shown that Ideas of human individuals, their empirical characters which partake of intelligible character, can be immortal. Even my own self could >relive< after my death, were there at least one human individual who experienced my special Idea. The problem now is how these Ideas can be apprehended. Here we enter the realm of aesthetics. By exploring the resources provided by aesthetic experience, the special Idea of the deceased can be enlivened.17 If we take special Ideas of human beings as aesthetic objects, as works of art, or poetry, it would be possible for us to contemplate them, abstracting their spatio-temporal characteristics. Thus their individuality, their Ideas can be grasped. (This is not a full-fledged aesthetics, as will be discussed below.) Here we depart from perception, the most perfect and satisfactory source of knowledge of Ideas. In contrast to knowledge of concepts, it is in essence perceptive, yet represents an infinite number of individuals.18 We perceive the deceased's remnants: his/her written works, creations of art; in our age, films, videos, tape recorders and the like. On the basis of these physical materials, our consciousness tries to comprehend the objective characteristics of these vestiges.19 This demands special energy and elasticity. Completely disinterested consciousness can achieve it. For there is an antagonism between the consciousness of ourselves and that of others.20 The more we grasp Ideas, the less we are conscious of ourselves. This is the price we pay in order to apprehend other individuals' special Ideas: losing ourselves we may live (be conscious of) others! But this process is very difficult indeed, only the genius possesses this power [370]. Yet the Idea can appear to everyone according to the measure of her/his own intellectual ability and knowledge.21
So immortality of individuals can be called mortal immortality.22 It is mortal precisely because it requires physical objects left by the deceased. It is immortality due to the fact that it has something to do with Ideas. The common opinion is that only the will is immortal, individuals perish. But here we find a possibility of immortality of individual beings hitherto known as mortals. Can we say that we are playing a trick on the will?
V
Some Consequences of Personal Immortality
Immortality of human individuals can be achieved through our dealing with others in an aesthetic manner: this means that under the force of the brute, unintelligible, abominable will and the unbearable necessities of the phenomenal world, we have found a path to salvation. Consider the other as one who has a special character, a special Idea of her/his own. It can be done only by respecting her/his own personality. This approach is consistent with Schopenhauer's conception of »compassion« (Mitleid). He says further that the purpose of all art is the communication of the apprehended Idea.23 Thus his conception of compassion, of crucial importance in his ethics and in his understanding of the telos of art, implies that salvation is not restricted solely to individuals each on his/her own, but it is related to the sensus communis. Therefore the decision of community members to live aesthetically, revealing the ability to have patience enough and respect in grasping each other's special Ideas, might be helpful in this undertaking. If the community succeeds in living an aesthetic form of life, then our tragicomical world may be able to recognize its potential for leading a fulfilled life. Of course, this requires the enhancement of our capacity to harmonize with our natural and social environment. As discussed by K. Boullart,24 an unbridgeable gap between the »particular and universal will« creates dissatisfaction and suffering. An aesthetic mode of living, in Schopenhauer's sense, can fill this gap by treating human individuals as Ideas. W. Schirmacher might object here that this mere aesthetics does not help us in overcoming the problems confronted in real-life situations.25 But aesthetic experience of the world is not an evasion or escape, it has nothing to do with »anthropofugales Denken«. In taking an aesthetic approach toward our problems we are not fugitives trying to avoid the inexorable facts of our life. Though we cannot change our intelligible character, by being conscious of ourselves, our limitations, we can, to a certain extent, attaining self-determination. We may then gain power to make »the will dance to intellect«26 though it may last but a moment.27 This aesthetic-ethical salvation within the system of the pessimist philosopher is our only hope.28 If aesthetic experience could be rendered part of our acquired character, then, though it sounds odd, the will-to-perceive Ideas might arise. This can be achieved through the transformation of the blind »will-to-life« into the »will-to-perceive-Ideas«, by harnessing the former with the help of the intellect which functions as quieter of the will as well as enhancing our ability to grasp Ideas. Thus Schopenhauer's voluntaristic metaphysics will be maintained, but the will, at least partially, will be tamed, and this will pave the way to salvation. Can we then conclude that our salvation is nothing but the »cunning of the will« (List des Willens), or temporary victory of the intellect over the will?
1. cf. Schopenhauer, WWR II, 463.
2. Socrates, Phaedo, 81 A.
3. Schopenhauer, PaP II, 43.
4. That Schopenhauer's Ideas are identical with Plato's is highly controversial; cf: Hein, Schopenhauer and Platonic Ideas, 133-144. Also, cf: Windelband, Lehrbuch, 535. Yet they play a very, important role, especially in aesthetic experience. Gardiner, Schopenhauer, 203ff, and Hamlyn, Schopenhauer, 104-114, 121f, 129-131, and others usually regard Ideas as a bridge between the will and the phenomenal world.
5. Schopenhauer, WWR I, 170.
6. Schopenhauer, WWR II, 364.
7. Schopenhauer, WWR I, 129.
8. Schopenhauer, WWR I, 276; WWR II, 479.
9. Schopenhauer, WWR I, 176.
10. Schopenhauer, WWR II, 13.
11. Schopenhauer, PaP II, 273.
12. Schopenhauer, WWR II, 471.
13. cf. Schopenhauer, WWR I, 287.
14. e.g., Schopenhauer, PaP II, no. 208.
15. Schopenhauer, WWR I, 158; cf. also WWR I, 224f. It seems to me the concept of »specialldea« is very hard to swallow for Gardiner and Hamlyn (Gardiner, Schopenhauer, 217-260; Hamlyn, Schopenhauer, 129), for they find inconsistency on this point. Neither of them is at peace with this concept. To me, the gist of individual immortality, together with aesthetic experience, lies in this concept!
16. Schopenhauer, WWR I, 289.
17. Perception of one's own special Idea might be different when one is alive from when one is not. On this point T.S. Eliot's lines are in order: »And what the dead had no speech for, when living, / They can tell you, being dead: the communication / Of the dead is tongued with fire beyond the language of the / living« (Little Gidding).
18. Schopenhauer, PaP II, 422; WWR I, 234.
19. Most of the great persons' special Ideas are grasped after their death: Es ist nun das Geschick der Grossen hier auf Erden / Erst wann sie nicht mehr sind, von uns erkannt zu werden.
20. Schopenhauer, WWR II, 367.
21. Schopenhauer, WWR I, 234.
22. In fact, Schopenhauer uses the phrase »temporal immortality« (zeitliche Unsterblichkeit): Schonhauer, WWR II, 479.
23. Schopenhauer, WWR I, 237.
24. Boullart, Schopenhauer, 82-100.
25. As he does by severely criticizing postmodernists: Schirmacher, »Schopenhauer und die Post-moderne«, 77ff. In his strictures he says the »Schongebiet der Kunst« should be forgotten (79).
26. Schopenhauer, WWR II, 208.
27. I have been inspired by R. Nicholls' magnificient paper to see the possibility of going beyond the madhouse of the will. Although his paper provides me with some hints, he may not share my ideas: Nicholls, »Schopenhauer's Analysis of Character«, 107-131.
28. Despite the existence of other ways to salvation, e.g. the ascetic way of life, it is our »only hope« in the sense that we need not dent our will; in this form of life we can learn to live in harmony with the will's blind impulses and to endure the boredom of the predetermined phenomenal world.
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